Hi there. I'm an assistant professor at Nanjing Audit University, Economics Experimental Laboratory.
My research is located in the area of behavioral and experimental economics. I've been working on, broadly speaking, decision-making in a group and as a group. I explore how preferences and judgments are shaped by the social environment, how individual preferences are aggregated into group decisions, and social interactions.
My recent focus is belief formation through narratives and persuasion.
My research is located in the area of behavioral and experimental economics. I've been working on, broadly speaking, decision-making in a group and as a group. I explore how preferences and judgments are shaped by the social environment, how individual preferences are aggregated into group decisions, and social interactions.
My recent focus is belief formation through narratives and persuasion.
Research
Majority rule or dictatorship? The role of collective-choice rules in self-governance via institutional design
with Eline van der Heijden
Collective-choice rules aggregate individual preferences into a collective decision. This study addresses the role of collective-choice rules in self-governance via institutional design in a social dilemma situation. Specifically, groups decide repeatedly on whether to establish any institution, and if so, which institution(s), to sustain cooperation in a public goods game. We hypothesize that collective-choice rules may directly affect cooperation, conditional on having the same institutions and indirectly affect cooperation through institutional choices. We implement three collective-choice rules: majority voting, dictatorship, and rotating dictatorship. Our main findings are: (1) cooperation level is not higher under the institutions chosen via democratic rule than when the same institutions are chosen via non-democratic rule. (2) Institutional choices made via majority voting or a fixed dictator are more stable over time than those chosen by rotating dictators. (3) The instability of institutions is associated with lower cooperation levels. These results have implications for the organization of group decision-making in self-governance.
with Eline van der Heijden
Collective-choice rules aggregate individual preferences into a collective decision. This study addresses the role of collective-choice rules in self-governance via institutional design in a social dilemma situation. Specifically, groups decide repeatedly on whether to establish any institution, and if so, which institution(s), to sustain cooperation in a public goods game. We hypothesize that collective-choice rules may directly affect cooperation, conditional on having the same institutions and indirectly affect cooperation through institutional choices. We implement three collective-choice rules: majority voting, dictatorship, and rotating dictatorship. Our main findings are: (1) cooperation level is not higher under the institutions chosen via democratic rule than when the same institutions are chosen via non-democratic rule. (2) Institutional choices made via majority voting or a fixed dictator are more stable over time than those chosen by rotating dictators. (3) The instability of institutions is associated with lower cooperation levels. These results have implications for the organization of group decision-making in self-governance.
The relativity of moral judgments
[paper available upon request]
Moral judgments are important factors in individual decision-making and interpersonal interactions. I examine the relativity of moral judgments, specifically, whether moral judgments toward a decision maker depend on the reference decision maker’s choice. The results of an experiment show that people punish a person who chooses an immoral action more harshly when they observe another moral choice than if they observe another immoral one. A contrast effect, rather than a shift in perceived social norms, accounts for the relativity. The relativity of moral judgments suggests that there exists non-monetary spillover effects of one's action on another. The results have implications for moral behavior in markets and in other social contexts.
[paper available upon request]
Moral judgments are important factors in individual decision-making and interpersonal interactions. I examine the relativity of moral judgments, specifically, whether moral judgments toward a decision maker depend on the reference decision maker’s choice. The results of an experiment show that people punish a person who chooses an immoral action more harshly when they observe another moral choice than if they observe another immoral one. A contrast effect, rather than a shift in perceived social norms, accounts for the relativity. The relativity of moral judgments suggests that there exists non-monetary spillover effects of one's action on another. The results have implications for moral behavior in markets and in other social contexts.
The persistent effect of biased narratives
with Sili Zhang
[paper available upon request]
Narratives biased towards different sides often create different impressions despite being based on the same facts, and people are becoming increasingly aware of the bias in news coverage (Gallup, 2020) in the era of mass media. Do biased narratives influence people's attitudes and subsequent information acquisition behavior, even when people have full awareness? In a series of online experiments, we investigate the impact of biased narratives by randomly assigning people to read narratives that are based on the same facts but biased toward a random side of a debatable and unfamiliar issue. We inform participants about the random assignment and then use a novel accuracy-based incentive to encourage them to read and evaluate further arguments from both sides. We elicit participants' attitudes right after their exposure to biased narratives and after the subsequent acquisition of arguments. Three main findings emerge. First, participants' attitudes shift toward the standpoint of the one-sided narrative they are randomly given. Second, participants do not read all arguments despite being incentivized to do so and they evaluate arguments aligned with the narrative they randomly read more favorably. Third, further arguments do not change participants' attitudes induced by the random exposure to biased narratives. Taken together, our results demonstrate the surprising persistent influence of biased narratives even though participants are fully aware of the bias. As people insufficiently counteract the influence of biased narratives through further information acquisition, biased narratives without necessarily distorting facts may self-perpetuate and lead to polarized beliefs.
with Sili Zhang
[paper available upon request]
Narratives biased towards different sides often create different impressions despite being based on the same facts, and people are becoming increasingly aware of the bias in news coverage (Gallup, 2020) in the era of mass media. Do biased narratives influence people's attitudes and subsequent information acquisition behavior, even when people have full awareness? In a series of online experiments, we investigate the impact of biased narratives by randomly assigning people to read narratives that are based on the same facts but biased toward a random side of a debatable and unfamiliar issue. We inform participants about the random assignment and then use a novel accuracy-based incentive to encourage them to read and evaluate further arguments from both sides. We elicit participants' attitudes right after their exposure to biased narratives and after the subsequent acquisition of arguments. Three main findings emerge. First, participants' attitudes shift toward the standpoint of the one-sided narrative they are randomly given. Second, participants do not read all arguments despite being incentivized to do so and they evaluate arguments aligned with the narrative they randomly read more favorably. Third, further arguments do not change participants' attitudes induced by the random exposure to biased narratives. Taken together, our results demonstrate the surprising persistent influence of biased narratives even though participants are fully aware of the bias. As people insufficiently counteract the influence of biased narratives through further information acquisition, biased narratives without necessarily distorting facts may self-perpetuate and lead to polarized beliefs.
Work in Progress
Coordinated resistance under censorship
with Tingting Wu
In the presence of a conflict of interest, leaders may censor undesired information from subordinates to maintain power and extract surplus. This study investigates the underlying mechanisms of censorship using a modified Coordinated Resistance (CR) game. In our game, payoffs are contingent on the state of nature. The leader is capable of censoring the state-related information before it reaches the subordinates, while the subordinates can coordinate on their decisions to resist or cooperate with their leader. Through a CR game-based experiment, we argue that the naivety of subordinates, the plausible deniability of censorship, and the uncertainty of payoffs all contribute to the failure of coordinated resistance. We check if these three contributors interact with the possibility of non-binding communication among subordinates.
with Tingting Wu
In the presence of a conflict of interest, leaders may censor undesired information from subordinates to maintain power and extract surplus. This study investigates the underlying mechanisms of censorship using a modified Coordinated Resistance (CR) game. In our game, payoffs are contingent on the state of nature. The leader is capable of censoring the state-related information before it reaches the subordinates, while the subordinates can coordinate on their decisions to resist or cooperate with their leader. Through a CR game-based experiment, we argue that the naivety of subordinates, the plausible deniability of censorship, and the uncertainty of payoffs all contribute to the failure of coordinated resistance. We check if these three contributors interact with the possibility of non-binding communication among subordinates.
