Hi there. I'm an assistant professor at Nanjing Audit University, Economics Experimental Laboratory.
My research is located in the area of behavioral and experimental economics. I've been working on, broadly speaking, decision-making in a group and as a group. I explore how preferences and judgments are shaped by the social environment, how individual preferences are aggregated into group decisions, and social interactions.
My recent focus is belief formation through narratives and persuasion.
My research is located in the area of behavioral and experimental economics. I've been working on, broadly speaking, decision-making in a group and as a group. I explore how preferences and judgments are shaped by the social environment, how individual preferences are aggregated into group decisions, and social interactions.
My recent focus is belief formation through narratives and persuasion.
Research
Majority rule or dictatorship? The role of collective-choice rules in self-governance via institutional design
with Eline van der Heijden
Collective-choice rules aggregate individual preferences into a collective decision. This study addresses the role of collective-choice rules in self-governance via institutional design in a social dilemma situation. Specifically, groups decide repeatedly on whether to establish any institution, and if so, which institution(s), to sustain cooperation in a public goods game. We hypothesize that collective-choice rules may directly affect cooperation, conditional on having the same institutions and indirectly affect cooperation through institutional choices. We implement three collective-choice rules: majority voting, dictatorship, and rotating dictatorship. Our main findings are: (1) cooperation level is not higher under the institutions chosen via democratic rule than when the same institutions are chosen via non-democratic rule. (2) Institutional choices made via majority voting or a fixed dictator are more stable over time than those chosen by rotating dictators. (3) The instability of institutions is associated with lower cooperation levels. These results have implications for the organization of group decision-making in self-governance.
with Eline van der Heijden
Collective-choice rules aggregate individual preferences into a collective decision. This study addresses the role of collective-choice rules in self-governance via institutional design in a social dilemma situation. Specifically, groups decide repeatedly on whether to establish any institution, and if so, which institution(s), to sustain cooperation in a public goods game. We hypothesize that collective-choice rules may directly affect cooperation, conditional on having the same institutions and indirectly affect cooperation through institutional choices. We implement three collective-choice rules: majority voting, dictatorship, and rotating dictatorship. Our main findings are: (1) cooperation level is not higher under the institutions chosen via democratic rule than when the same institutions are chosen via non-democratic rule. (2) Institutional choices made via majority voting or a fixed dictator are more stable over time than those chosen by rotating dictators. (3) The instability of institutions is associated with lower cooperation levels. These results have implications for the organization of group decision-making in self-governance.
The relativity of moral judgments
[paper available upon request]
Moral judgments are important factors in individual decision-making and interpersonal interactions. I examine the relativity of moral judgments, specifically, whether moral judgments toward a decision maker depend on the reference decision maker’s choice. The results of an experiment show that people punish a person who chooses an immoral action more harshly when they observe another moral choice than if they observe another immoral one. A contrast effect, rather than a shift in perceived social norms, accounts for the relativity. The relativity of moral judgments suggests that there exists non-monetary spillover effects of one's action on another. The results have implications for moral behavior in markets and in other social contexts.
[paper available upon request]
Moral judgments are important factors in individual decision-making and interpersonal interactions. I examine the relativity of moral judgments, specifically, whether moral judgments toward a decision maker depend on the reference decision maker’s choice. The results of an experiment show that people punish a person who chooses an immoral action more harshly when they observe another moral choice than if they observe another immoral one. A contrast effect, rather than a shift in perceived social norms, accounts for the relativity. The relativity of moral judgments suggests that there exists non-monetary spillover effects of one's action on another. The results have implications for moral behavior in markets and in other social contexts.
The persistent effect of biased narratives
with Sili Zhang
[paper available upon request]
Can people counteract biased narratives---the qualitative interpretation of objective facts or events---through subsequent information acquisition? Using an online experiment, we investigate this question by first randomly assigning participants to read different narratives that contain the same facts, and then offering them the opportunity to acquire balanced arguments. We document three main findings. First, participants shift their attitudes towards the standpoint of the randomly assigned narrative, knowing that the narrative is biased and randomly assigned. Second, the opportunity to read additional arguments does not prompt participants to adjust their attitudes shaped by the initial narrative. Third, when evaluating subsequent arguments, participants find arguments aligned with the randomly assigned narrative more convincing, which likely contributes to their inability to counteract biased narratives. Taken together, our results demonstrate a persistent effect of biased narratives and highlight the importance of balanced exposure at the outset.
with Sili Zhang
[paper available upon request]
Can people counteract biased narratives---the qualitative interpretation of objective facts or events---through subsequent information acquisition? Using an online experiment, we investigate this question by first randomly assigning participants to read different narratives that contain the same facts, and then offering them the opportunity to acquire balanced arguments. We document three main findings. First, participants shift their attitudes towards the standpoint of the randomly assigned narrative, knowing that the narrative is biased and randomly assigned. Second, the opportunity to read additional arguments does not prompt participants to adjust their attitudes shaped by the initial narrative. Third, when evaluating subsequent arguments, participants find arguments aligned with the randomly assigned narrative more convincing, which likely contributes to their inability to counteract biased narratives. Taken together, our results demonstrate a persistent effect of biased narratives and highlight the importance of balanced exposure at the outset.
Work in Progress
Mistake or misbelief? Decomposing strategic naïvety about undisclosed information
with Tingting Wu
In persuasion games, theories predict the unravelling result, which states that senders will voluntarily disclosure their private information as long as the information is verifiable and disclosure is costless. This prediction rests on the assumption that receivers are sophisticated when interpreting undisclosed information. Howerver, previous research finds that receivers are often naïve about undisclosed information and hence senders’ incomplete unraveling justified. In this paper, we experimentally examine whether receivers’ naivety are driven by mistakes (and which mistakes) in best-responding or by misbeliefs about senders’ strategies.
with Tingting Wu
In persuasion games, theories predict the unravelling result, which states that senders will voluntarily disclosure their private information as long as the information is verifiable and disclosure is costless. This prediction rests on the assumption that receivers are sophisticated when interpreting undisclosed information. Howerver, previous research finds that receivers are often naïve about undisclosed information and hence senders’ incomplete unraveling justified. In this paper, we experimentally examine whether receivers’ naivety are driven by mistakes (and which mistakes) in best-responding or by misbeliefs about senders’ strategies.
When to feed the Leviathan: Tradeoffs between efficiency, equality, and the intrinsic value of decision rights
with Yadi Yang
In light of major crises such as global pandemics and climate change, individuals often fall short in providing adequate public goods. We investigate how people choose between voluntary provision and external intervention from a centralized institution that coerces cooperation in a threshold public goods game. Specifically, we examine how individuals make trade-offs between the efficiency of public goods provision, the fairness in contribution levels, and the intrinsic value of decision rights.
with Yadi Yang
In light of major crises such as global pandemics and climate change, individuals often fall short in providing adequate public goods. We investigate how people choose between voluntary provision and external intervention from a centralized institution that coerces cooperation in a threshold public goods game. Specifically, we examine how individuals make trade-offs between the efficiency of public goods provision, the fairness in contribution levels, and the intrinsic value of decision rights.
